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2 Militarization 2.0
have analyzed how new information and communication technologies im-
pact on these processes. The essays in this forum address this gap, and
consider the political significance of new technologies, new actors, and
new practices that shape “Militarization 2.0” and normalize political vio-
lence in the digital age. The authors in this forum rely, to varying degrees,
on common militarized tropes and dichotomies (such as authenticity, be-
longing, and (de)humanizing framings) that are key to militarization, in-
cluding those devices that rest on gender, race/ethnicity, and heteronor-
mativity. Moving beyond a military-centered approach to militarization,
the authors’ questions cover ministries of foreign affairs; the embodied
performances of celebrity leaders and insurgency groups; arms produc-
ers, the military video game industry, and private military and security
companies; and violence entrepreneurs. The forum closes with reflections
from Cynthia Enloe.
Keywords: militarization, social media, intersectionality
Militarization 2.0: Introduction
SUSAN T. JACKSON
Stockholm University
RHYS CRILLEY
University of Glasgow
AND
ILAN MANOR
University of Oxford
In 2020, more than 4.5 billion people around the world have access to the inter-
net, and more than 3.8 billion access social media platforms every month (Kemp
2020). The internet and associated new information and communication technolo-
gies (ICTs) are now part of the fabric of daily life for billions of people (Castells
2013), with implications for who communicates to whom, what they communicate,
and how. This shifting media ecology is disrupting “how international relations is
done, by whom, and what it involves” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2015,
1). Although states and non-state actors now incorporate new ICTs into their uses
and abuses of political violence, the social, communicative, and participatory as-
pects of new ICTs often are overlooked in international relations (IR) scholarship
(Hamilton 2016).
Undoubtedly, ICTs have important ramifications for issues at the heart of the
discipline, including political economy, security, and, of course, war and milita-
rization. While scholars explore how states and other actors normalize their use
of force through practices of militarization (Enloe 2000; Cockburn 2010; Welland
2017; Basham 2018; Baker 2020), there remains little attention given to how mil-
itarization works in and through new ICTs in the digital age. This is a significant
gap given that militarization is a communicative process whereby political violence
is normalized (Lutz 2007, 320), and new ICTs have reconfigured global commu-
nications over recent decades. In light of this, this forum sets out to explore the
relationship(s) between new ICTs and militarization, drawing together and build-
ing upon research that highlights how militarization is changing in the digital age
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and why this is important for the discipline of IR. In doing so, it provides a de-
tailed exploration of issues arising at the intersections of security, militarization,
and ICTs—in particular, in regard to contemporary Web 2.0 technologies. We now
situate the forum within the broader study of militarization, and offer conceptual
clarifications regarding the need for an appreciation of “Militarization 2.0.”
Militarism has to do with both being disposed toward and having the social
purpose to use military force, while militarization is an embedded sociological
process—underpinned by communication (Stavrianakis and Selby 2012; Mabee and
Vucetic 2018). Because this process has implications for how militarism manifests in
and across societies (Abrahamsen 2018), we focus in this forum on how ICTs inter-
sect with and facilitate a wide variety of actors and practices in militarization as a
communicative process that normalizes political violence. While individual authors
in this forum vary in their subject and method of analysis, as a group we agree that
militarization involves the process of communication to prepare for, normalize, and
legitimize war (Stavrianakis and Stern 2018). This process includes any means by
which societies come to “imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be
not only valuable but also normal” (Enloe 2000, 3) and is underpinned by political
actors communicating that war and the use of force are “good, natural and nec-
essary” (Jackson 2012). Subsequently, militarization cannot be understood only by
measuring military strength and capability (Bowman 2002), but instead requires an
attention to a diverse range of media, communication, and everyday sites and prac-
tices that are crucial spaces for understanding how various actors normalize war and
political violence (Eichler 2012; Tidy 2015; Basham 2016a; Teaiwa 2017; Dyvik and
Welland 2018; Chisholm and Ketola 2020; Partis-Jennings 2020).
In recent years, scholars have drawn attention to myriad ways in which milita-
rization functions and can be analyzed (Stavrianakis and Selby 2012; Howell 2018;
Stavrianakis and Stern 2018; MacKenzie et al. 2019). However, scholars have yet to
comprehensively account for how militarization is changing in the digital age and
what impact these changes have on practices of IR and the discipline of IR (with
some exceptions, e.g., Deibert 2003; Feigenbaum 2011; O’Hagan 2013; Kuntsman
and Stein 2015). If militarization involves the normalization of war and political
violence through communication, and new ICTs have become a fundamental as-
pect of everyday life, then it is vital that the study of IR takes into account the roles
these new technologies play in normalizing war. As Ronald Deibert notes, given the
speed at which ICTs develop and proliferate, it is imperative to analyze how new
ICTs shape “the circulation of ideas, the framing role of discourses, and processes
of legitimation” (2003, 530). The purpose and focus of the essays collected in this
forum are to therefore explore how new ICTs are having a militarizing function and
impacting how political actors communicate and normalize their uses of political vi-
olence.
The rise of Web 2.0 technologies has led to several changes in contemporary
communication that stand out as part of the shift from a one-way, broadcast me-
dia ecology to a hybrid media system (Chadwick 2013; Jackson 2019a). Because
of new ICTs, information now circulates the globe in real time, in larger volumes
and at higher speeds than ever before. The growth of ICTs has contributed signif-
icantly to visual media becoming ever more important in communication (Weber
2008; Bleiker 2018), and digital ICTs have collapsed the distinctions between pro-
ducers and audiences of media content, as social media platforms are reliant on
the active participation of users in producing and sharing content (Rosen 2006).
Finally, ICTs enable publics and political actors alike to bypass traditional media
gatekeepers. Subsequently, political actors no longer simply work with media actors
to communicate their messages, they have now become media actors themselves
(Simmons 2011). Following this, we define militarization 2.0 broadly as digitally me-
diated discourses and practices concerned with the use of Web 2.0 technologies to
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communicate that war and political violence are a commonsense, normal, and, at
times, necessary solution to political problems.
In response to such developments, we ask: how do new ICT’s impact militariza-
tion? The contributions below suggest that the changes identified above combine
in ways that are significant for militarization. The first factor involves the content
and structural changes that new ICTs offer: volume, speed, and visuality (including
moving images and sound). Political actors can utilize ICTs to support militaristic
endeavors in ways that they could not do so before, e.g., through creating social
media pages to spread their messaging and for recruitment, fundraising, and other
organizational purposes that contribute to maintaining militarism. These practices
enable both traditional and new actors involved in processes of militarization to
communicate their messages in novel ways, in real time, and to potentially larger
audiences at a lower cost than was previously possible.
The second major shift concerns how new ICTs enable users to bypass the tradi-
tional communications gatekeepers—themedia—to reach out directly to those they
seek to influence domestically and globally (O’Hagan 2013). Whether it is state ac-
tors such as ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) or prime ministers, or non-state
actors such as corporations, insurgents, or entrepreneurs, new ICTs facilitate direct
communication, which, in turn, impacts the type of content these actors generate
and circulate. The tailoring of content for specific audiences has implications for
IR, as militarization becomes diffused through new actors and new platforms in new
ways that go beyond traditional accounts of war and the broadcast media (Hoskins
and O’Loughlin 2010; Merrin 2018).
How audiences themselves participate in militarization is changing as a result
of these structural and content changes. In particular, social media encourage new
modes of expression for audience involvement in militarization processes—whether
through liking, sharing, commenting on, and/or producing content (Crilley 2016).
Social media draw in users to experiences so that they themselves become promi-
nent in not only sharing militarized social media content, but also producing such
content, and repurposing ICTs in novel ways that serve militarization processes.
These developments are an essential part of understanding militarization and
contemporary IR. Not least, this is because of the role they can play in normalizing
war and political violence through the spread of norms and values that implicitly
and explicitly convey that war and violence are legitimate. As such, we now call
for attention to militarization 2.0 and how ICTs are today a key part of how milita-
rization functions in contemporary global politics. In addition, these developments
influence how we research militarization in the digital age. They prompt us to move
militarization 2.0 research beyond a narrow focus on militaries while adopting an
interdisciplinary approach: attuned to the collection of Big Data, visual analysis,
network analysis, and more. Finally, it requires us to be flexible, experimental, and
innovative in our study of militarization.
Focusing on how political actors use ICTs to claim legitimacy for military force
and normalize this kind of violence, each essay builds upon current research on
how these actors contribute to and reify the “natural” role of the military, prompt-
ing us to ask how militarization 2.0 differs depending on the actors involved? This
forum challenges IR to widen the scope of which actors, practices, and spaces are
considered in studies of militarization. We aim to contribute to conceptual discus-
sions on militarization by focusing on understudied actors and practices, and what
the digital age means for militarization, particularly in regard to how new ICTs facil-
itate “creative processes that produce destruction” (Shah in MacKenzie et al. 2019,
822) by normalizing the use of force.
The authors here rely, to varying degrees, on common militarized tropes and di-
chotomies (such as authenticity, belonging, and (de)humanizing framings) that are
key tomilitarization, including those devices that rest on gender, race/ethnicity, and
heteronormativity. Beginning with MFAs, Rhys Crilley and Ilan Manor consider how
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social media encourage MFAs to shift from a traditional diplomatic role to one that
supports militaristic endeavors through linguistic and visual dichotomies that dehu-
manize others. Catherine Baker examines celebrity leader personas and embodied
militarism in the digital age, focusing on the fashioned, embodied, gendered, and
racialized performances of state leaders and the use of “celebrity techniques” that
reify the idea that military force is natural. Modupe Oshikoya discusses the chal-
lenges posed to state militaries by insurgency groups and issues around the digital
“militarization of terrorism,” in particular how the Boko Haram counter-insurgency
campaign uses embodied performances online to challenge the gendered military
order in Nigeria. The forum then shifts from state actors and their challengers to
the role of quasi-state actors, where Susan T. Jackson, Jutta Joachim, Nick Robinson,
and Andrea Schneiker explore how arms producers, the military video game indus-
try, and private military and security companies (PMSCs) rely on a set of militarized
tropes and online marketing techniques to “sell” the public ideas about national
security and militarism. Next, Nicole S Grove examines the relationship between
the warfighter (here, the “violence entrepreneur”), public support, and the impact
of new digital crowdfunding platforms, and encourages us to analyze militarization
creatively rather than through a narrow checklist of state-centric indicators. The
forum concludes with a set of reflections on militarization 2.0 from Cynthia Enloe.
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Militarization 2.0
RHYS CRILLEY
University of Glasgow
AND
ILAN MANOR
University of Oxford
The role of the military in processes of militarization has been well documented
by scholars of IR (Enloe 2000; Stavrianakis and Selby 2012). While the military has
been a prominent actor in driving forward the normalization of the preparation
for war in society (A˚häll 2016), the mass adoption of ICTs has fostered other actors
being involved in processes of militarization (Stahl 2010; O’Hagan 2013; Kuntsman
and Stein 2015; Crilley 2016). We ask here how has the emergence of social media
impacted the involvement of MFAs in militarization processes? We suggest that the
advent of social media has important ramifications for the process and study of mili-
tarization in contemporary IR scholarship, not least because they mark a significant
change whereby actors previously viewed as being concerned with the negotiation
of peace now contribute to the normalization of conflict through the communi-
cation of simplified, propagandistic messages to both international and domestic
audiences on social media.
Communication underpins how militarization functions, and within IR, research
has focused on how militaries work with other actors—e.g., private companies, jour-
nalists, Hollywood directors, and video game designers—in order to communicate
their messages to audiences (Enloe 2000; Stahl 2010). Der Derian (2009) refers to
this military collaboration as the military-industrial-media-entertainment-network,
where the military uses and works with various actors to create diverse forms of me-
dia communications that serve military interests and contribute to militarization. In
this context, research focuses onmilitaries as a driving factor of militarization, at the
expense of analyzing other state actors such as diplomats and MFAs. This division
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reflects a general understanding that diplomats and MFAs are the arm of the state
that is concerned with finding diplomatic, peaceful solutions to international dis-
agreements. Indeed, the definitive text for diplomats and scholars of diplomacy—
Satow’s Diplomatic Practice (Roberts 2011)—defines diplomacy as the peaceful con-
duct of business between states. This distinction between violent militaries and
peaceful diplomats is somewhat reductive, but with the rise of Web 2.0 technolo-
gies greater attention needs to be paid to how diplomats and MFAs now contribute
to the normalization of war through their use of social media (see also Baker and
Oshikoya in this forum).
The rise of digital diplomacy, whereby MFAs and diplomats use social media to
engage directly with foreign and domestic audiences, leads to MFAs playing a key
role in normalizing the use of force as a solution to political problems. This milita-
rization is driven by social media, which facilitates and encourages MFAs to produce
media in easy to view and share formats and in real time. Subsequently, MFAs pro-
duce textual and visual media that serve to reduce complex issues into simple di-
chotomies while also dehumanizing belligerents (Manor and Crilley 2018). In turn,
this serves to make diplomatic solutions to political disagreements more difficult
as conflict and the use of force become normalized. To date, few studies have ex-
plored whether, and how, MFAs contribute to militarization. This gap is substantial
given that during conflicts in the digital age, MFAs are tasked with creating an on-
line environment that enables a country to obtain its foreign policy goals, including
real-time justifications of state-sanctioned political violence through social media.
In this context, MFAs seek to use social media to legitimize the use of force and
ward off attempts by other actors to end hostilities before such goals can be ob-
tained. We explore how MFAs contribute to militarization 2.0 here by focusing on
the case of the Israeli MFA during the Gaza War of 2014, and we demonstrate how
MFAs now use social media in propagandistic ways that reduce complex political
conflicts into simple dichotomies for global and local audiences, thereby contribut-
ing to militarization.
The Israeli MFA’s use of Twitter during the 2014 Gaza War constitutes a process
of militarization as the MFA’s tweets served to normalize the use of armed force
and frame it as a “good, natural and necessary” (Jackson 2016) solution to a polit-
ical crisis. Work in IR has identified linguistic dichotomies as being fundamental
to the construction of identity and the legitimation of foreign policy (Campbell
1998; Hansen 2006), and we suggest that through the use of linguistic and visual
dichotomies published on Twitter, the Israeli MFA normalized Israel’s use of force
during the Gaza War of 2014.
Throughout the Gaza War, the Israeli MFA communicated three representative
dichotomies on Twitter (Manor and Crilley 2018). The first contrasted a “good Is-
rael” with an “evil Hamas.” This construction of identity was evident in visual me-
dia that depicted Israeli women and children as victims, while Palestinian children
were only depicted as cartoons and, often, as Hamas combatants. Such images sug-
gest that Palestinian children are potential combatants or future terrorists; this di-
chotomy also was manifest in images stating that “Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas.”
These images frame Israel’s use of military force as legitimate in response to an evil
terrorist other. Furthermore, these images serve to make the Israeli self-inclusive of
a broader notion of the West, united in the global fight against ISIS.
The second dichotomy, which portrayed Israel’s use of force as a “natural” re-
sponse to an unnatural enemy that targets civilians, was evident in videos that ask
the viewer “what would you do?” if you only had fifteen seconds to find shelter from
rockets. Such videos depicted Israeli children as white, Western, and engaged in
everyday activities such as attending school or playing soccer. These activities were
then disrupted by the sound of sirens. Hamas was thus depicted as an unnatural
enemy that targets children. Furthermore, the MFA employed aerial footage that
showed Palestinians as blurry gray dots on a screen. Such imagery is constitutive
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of a visuality of “clean war” (Stahl 2010, 25) where the effects of military force are
sanitized and war is made to appear bloodless.
The third dichotomy suggested that Israel’s military force was necessary, as citi-
zens were being targeted, while Hamas attacks were unnecessary. The Israeli MFA
argued that large civilian casualties in Gaza were a natural outcome of Hamas’ use
of civilians as human shields. Here, the whole of Gaza was visually represented as
being a military base of Hamas. Such images imply that it is necessary to kill Pales-
tinian civilians as they are all potential Hamas combatants. These three dichotomies
were prevalent across more than 700 Israeli MFA tweets published during the Gaza
War and they contribute to processes of militarization as they normalize the use of
force.
Ultimately, the Israeli MFA’s representation of the Gaza War on Twitter sought
to dehumanize Palestinians and make social media users relate to and feel emo-
tions for Israeli civilians. Such a framing of the conflict limits the critique of Israel
because “when we get emotionally involved, questioning becomes difficult, and in
the process we risk forgetting the politics of what we are watching” (A˚häll 2016,
165). Notably, Israel’s “what would you do?” messaging on social media during the
Gaza War generated more audience engagement—in terms of likes, shares, com-
ments, and reach—than other social media content disseminated by the Israeli state
(Yarchi et al. 2017). The militarized social media content created and shared by the
Israeli MFA permeates everyday social media spaces, and leads to social media users
“aligning themselves with Israeli military violence” (Kuntsman and Stein 2015, 86).
Importantly, the MFA’s Twitter content reaches multiple audiences both at home
and abroad. This highlights how militarization 2.0 spreads across transnational bor-
ders and is not limited to making a domestic audience feel that war is legitimate but
is also targeted at gaining the support of international audiences. In militarization
2.0, the lines between external propaganda and internal messaging for domestic
audiences therefore become blurred, as actors such as MFAs seek to use social me-
dia to convince their own citizens and foreign audiences that their use of force is
legitimate.
While it is not surprising that MFAs will seek to legitimize the state’s use of mili-
tary force during wars, the Israeli MFA shared militarized representations based on
problematic dichotomies that oversimplify the political, social, and cultural reality
at hand. In the MFA’s tweets, Israelis were humanized and victimized while Pales-
tinians were dehumanized and visually framed as threats. By portraying Palestinians
as addicted to terror, and dehumanizing them, the MFA contributed to making any
future solution harder to achieve as its audiences—at home and abroad—are un-
likely to view Hamas as a credible partner for peace or to acknowledge the pain
and suffering of Palestinians (Head 2016, 113). This tension highlights the mil-
itarized form of diplomacy projected by the Israeli MFA on social media, and is
worrying as it limits the possibilities for diplomacy to be used to solve crises and
conflicts.
The daily use of social media has transformed how state actors can communi-
cate with audiences (see Baker and Oshikoya in this forum). This interaction is
altering militarization and its affects, as MFAs can now bypass the media to com-
municate directly with domestic and global audiences simultaneously in real time.
These audiences then also contribute to the circulation of militarized content as
they share it within their social networks. MFAs learn from these practices, col-
lecting data from social media sites and tailoring their content to reach specific
audiences.
All of this is changing who is involved in processes of militarization, as new ac-
tors such as MFAs and individuals become involved in the normalization of war
on social media (see Grove in this forum). If we are to continue to understand,
challenge, and contest militarization in its various guises, it is imperative that we
study militarization 2.0 beyond the realm of the military and explore “war’s covert
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presence in our putatively civil institutions” (Barkawi in MacKenzie et al. 2019, 823)
such as MFAS and other diplomatic institutions (Haastrup in MacKenzie et al. 2019,
825). In the digital age, this requires that we consider the myriad ways in which so-
cial media technologies are transforming how war, and the use of armed force, is
communicated as a commonsense solution to political problems by actors we would
hope to be more concerned with diplomacy, negotiation, and peace.
Celebrity Leader Personas and Embodied
Militarism
CATHERINE BAKER
University of Hull
This essay examines how new ICTs can contribute to the everyday militarism of
political leaders’ embodied performances. In particular, it considers the example
of online images of Croatia’s first female president, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic´, that
have associated her public persona with the nation’s military—a public persona
constructed around an “embodied militarism.” Although leaders’ embodied perfor-
mances are not new, digital ICTs do create some notable new affordances for lead-
ers’ persona construction, through the mutually reinforcing effects of social media’s
inherent visuality—in particular, digital image banks and the capacity to use visual
social media to bypass traditional media in reaching the public. These affordances
might sometimes provide the capacity for leaders’ viral images and videos to dis-
tract users’ talk away from state violence—such as Benjamin Netanyahu performing
the “chicken dance” with Israel’s Eurovision 2018 winner Netta Barzilai days after
the killing of 52 unarmed Palestinian protestors in Gaza (Reuters 2018), or Melania
Trump wearing a chain-store parka with a dismissive slogan while authorities were
separating migrant children at the United States–Mexico border (Butchart 2018).
They also have the potential to quietly normalize everyday militarism, an impor-
tant part of normalizing state violence. Although the harnessing of celebrity tech-
niques by political leaders is a phenomenon with long historical roots, leaders such
as Grabar-Kitarovic´ have perhaps never been so well equipped as now to harness
techniques of celebrity in normalizing the forms of militarism on which this forum
reflects. If world leaders are the international political figures whose communica-
tive practices might have needed least change in adapting to today’s “global culture
of mobile capture and viral circulation” (Kuntsman and Stein 2015, 7), this essay
asks whether the embodied aesthetics of militarism they can now perform have any
new implications because they operate through digital ICTs.
After Grabar-Kitarovic´’s election in 2015, images of her visiting bases in uniform
and pointing rifles during arms fairs became reference points in public debates
about Croatian civil–military relations throughout her 2015–2020 presidency. Em-
bodied performances of militarism quickly became a recognizable aspect of her
digital public communication, and did so at a time when new ICTs allow their
users to bypass traditional gatekeepers when communicating with the public, and
when social media platforms’ architecture makes images extra significant in news
dissemination. While aesthetic techniques of constructing celebrity personas have
long been resources in political and diplomatic communication, social media plat-
forms and the interplay between digital spaces for disseminating and sharing news
have projected many more leader images into the public sphere, often produced
and captured by leaders themselves and their own publicity teams. This thickens,
and ascribes extra authenticity to, their personas. Underlined by the “immediacy”
(Hansen 2011, 55–56) of the visual image when attached to news articles or posted
on Grabar-Kitarovic´’s own social media channels, images of Grabar-Kitarovic´’s
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frequent wearing of camouflage uniform and posing with weapons and equipment
visualize an unusually direct military association and create a sense of authentic-
ity, especially when posted on channels that purport to be direct communication
between leader and user—a novelty that digital media have added to what our in-
troduction calls “militarization as a communicative process” (see Jackson et al. in
this forum for authenticity). Posted in a format that enhances the links between
the everyday and the authentic, these images align her both with the 1991–1995
Croatian war of independence (termed the “Homeland War” in Croatia, and en-
shrined as a national origin myth by Croatia’s wartime president Franjo Tuđman
(Jovic´ 2017))—which has naturalized the military as heroic defenders of national
independence—and with Grabar-Kitarovic´’s own discourse of rearmament as eco-
nomic and symbolic regeneration, enabling Croatia to support its Western allies in
defending Europe against shared security threats.
What contribute particular salience to such performances and personas, past and
present, are “visual logics of gender” (A˚häll 2018, 150) in world politics, which in-
tersect with visual logics of “race” and other power structures to construct orders of
how differently gendered bodies should appear and act. Female leaders draw par-
ticular attention for exercising power in what were until the late twentieth century
almost always male-occupied roles, from which “constituencies [still] expect not
only maleness but (more importantly) masculinity” (Sjoberg 2013, 162) because
they deal with the politics of security and defense. Indeed, a sole female leader in
summit photographs of otherwise all-male groups of statesmen makes viewers notice
how male they are (Enloe 2014, 28). The visuality of leaders’ public appearances,
moreover, extends beyond relative ratios of gendered bodies in material spaces of
statecraft into the gendered visuality of clothing, fashioning, and moving the body
itself.
Two ideas from celebrity studies offer added insights into militarization 2.0 and
the added role that social media and other new ICTs have enabled leaders’ embod-
ied performances to play in communicating that political violence is normal. The
first is the idea that star personas are produced through meta-“texts,” built from
what spectators already know about stars from other representations when they see
their images or performances (Dyer 1998, 63; see also Jackson et al. in this forum on
intertextuality); the second is how fashioned and embodied performances operate
in constructing those personas. Entertainment celebrities and sporting competitors
can symbolize their nations, when media frame them that way; being a head of
state, however, inherently frames holders as personifying their states and nations,
especially those who hold office because of what is thought to be the people’s will.
Political figures’ embodied performances, circulating as visual images, have often
been how fashion makes its international political significance known: Margaret
Thatcher crafted “dressed performances” including test-driving a Challenger tank
during a NATO exercise in West Germany in a Queen-like headscarf and flying in
for her 1987 Moscow visit wearing a fur hat and coat (D. Conway 2017, 182). The
sartorial conventions Thatcher helped to establish, offering professional women
a mode of dress that contained the female body’s “potential eroticism” while still
“look[ing] like a woman” (Entwistle 2015, 189), indeed created the power-dressed
“Iron Lady” as an archetypal (white) femininity of contemporary international poli-
tics (see Laher 2014, 108–10; van Zoonen 2006). In the digital age, Grabar-Kitarovic´
provides an illustrative insight into how star personas, alongside fashioned and em-
bodied performances, are now prominently produced, circulated, and interpreted
through digital visuality on social media sites.
Grabar-Kitarovic´, who was NATO’s assistant secretary-general for public diplo-
macy in 2011–2014 while NATO was promoting its adoption of the Women, Peace
and Security agenda (seeWright 2016), has constructed her public persona through
strategically crafted dressed performances similar to Thatcher’s—including some
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that reveal how the aesthetics of celebrity can make leaders’ own embodied per-
formances a vehicle for militarization in ways that social media amplifies. These
performances can have “digital diplomacy” functions (see Crilley and Manor in
this forum) and/or be aimed at public and political audiences in leaders’ home
contexts. The persona Grabar-Kitarovic´ constructed through social media during
her 2014–2015 presidential election campaign, harnessing the authenticity of her
NATO experience, was that of a leader promising to restore national dignity during
protracted financial crisis, and appealing to the hegemonic public narrative of the
“Homeland War” as a model for national unity and regeneration. Through images
shared online, Grabar-Kitarovic´ appeared to take the role of Tuđman’s symbolic
daughter, personifying Croatia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions (NATO
in 2009, the EU in 2013) and thus realizing Tuđman’s dream. Association with the
Croatian military—that is, militarization—was a characteristic theme in her public
performances, as indeed was association with another masculine social institution
constructed as a repository of national heroism, the Croatian men’s football team.
Both news images and personal photos circulated through social media rein-
forced the association of Grabar-Kitarovic´ with military themes. Soon after taking
office, Grabar-Kitarovic´ started wearing Croatian camouflage uniforms or jackets to
visit troops at several army and naval bases in Croatia, and on her May 2015 visit
to Croatian forces in Afghanistan she embodied a distinctive “militarized feminin-
ity” (Sjoberg 2007) of nation and command. Grabar-Kitarovic´’s careful matching of
uniform to task and branch even equipped editors illustrating future stories with
photographs of her in three different colorways of uniform: one image from Camp
Marmal in Afghanistan showed her in aviator sunglasses standing casually and smil-
ing with her hand on a drone—almost too perfectly updating the gender politics
of Carol Cohn’s “pat the missile” (see Cohn 1987, 695) for the era of unmanned
digital aerial surveillance and UNSCR 1325. The theme even extended into her
personal photography: for example, one of the most popular images shared on
Facebook by Grabar-Kitarovic´ (from the first year of her presidency until November
2019) displayed herself during the August holidays painting her house while wear-
ing a desert-colored T-shirt and camouflage trousers (with the caption “([thumbs-
up emoji] TO WORK) I also like working so it’s not beneath me, even today, to
‘roll up my sleeves’ and decorate my apartment. Whatever some people think about
it. . .”) (Grabar-Kitarovic´ 2015). This off-duty image might seem more casual than
typical media coverage of state leaders, yet it is precisely the kind of banal, every-
day, domestic image users expect to see and share on social media, interwoven
with entertainment content and glimpses into friends’ lives. Facebook comments
accompanying this image show that the audience that viewed it identified with
the activity in the image and the camouflage pattern choice of her clothing. The
publication of the image and the engagement it engenders is a clear example of
embodied militarism in the everyday and is, importantly, facilitated through social
media.
Grabar-Kitarovic´’s performances of embodied militarism were significant enough
in her public persona that Croatian journalists, comedians, and opposition politi-
cians referred to them in debates about her presidency or civil–military relations
(Jambrešic´ Kirin 2017). Digital images abound of Grabar-Kitarovic´ posing with ri-
fles or military equipment at other sites connected to the military or the arms trade
(including the ASDA arms fair in Split), and they placed her presidential authority
behind Croatia’s status as a buyer/seller of weapons, materiel, and expertise. While
her speeches in settings such as ASDA reminded the Croatian public that military
technology also leads to civilian innovation, the rifle photographs were much “stick-
ier” in news and social media, thanks to the potential virality of an armed female
president’s image amplified by the image-bank effect. This affordance is a novel con-
sequence of new ICTs. These and other photographs entered media—and military
(see Roderick 2016)—digital image banks, which contain an even greater volume
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isr/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa035/5866651 by guest on 06 August 2020
SUSAN T. JACKSON ET AL. 11
of images than traditional press photography and link existing pictures to fresh sto-
ries when they remediate archived photographs as new featured images: a picture
of Grabar-Kitarovic´ in uniform atop an article about her taking a strong position on
an apparently unrelated issue is a visual signal to read her actions as a militarized
president’s—one who is deemed to be strong and authoritative.
Using the leader’s gendered body for national and international public commu-
nication is not new to the social media moment, but arguably is as old as state lead-
ership. The same goes for leaders’ harnessing of fashion, and of the same persona-
construction practices that create celebrities as star persona “meta-texts.” New ICTs
might not thus substantially change the part celebrity leaders could already play in
militarization even though they have facilitated new types of visual artifact such as
memes (Särmä 2016) and viral videos. They seem to remediate established visual-
ized logics of race and gender in world politics even though, as Oshikoya argues,
they also have the potential to change them. The most significant new affordance of
one new ICT, social media, might even be the capacity for leaders’ viral images and
videos to distract audiences from state violence. However, the volume of still and
moving images transmitted through social media, their interwovenness with per-
sonal and entertainment content, and the degree of embeddedness this can facili-
tate arguably help leaders create thicker celebrity personas than ever before, mak-
ing the “everydayness of militarized projects” (Kuntsman and Stein 2015, 11; original
emphasis) that much more everyday and making the authenticity of their militarism
seem all the more natural.
The Role of Social Media in Changing the
Gendered Military Order in the
Counter-insurgency Campaign in Nigeria
MODUPE OSHIKOYA
Virginia Wesleyan University
My contribution discusses how the use of ICTs by Jama¯’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah
wa’l-Jiha¯d, otherwise known as Boko Haram, has recontextualized the normaliza-
tion of violence within Nigerian society that the military has fundamentally pos-
sessed and maintained since independence. Previously, the Nigerian military used
traditional forms of media to engage, assert, and reassure both the domestic and
international communities about the military’s successful counter-insurgency cam-
paign. However, Boko Haram has actively undermined these claims through Twitter
and professional-looking Facebook videos of successful raids on the civilian pop-
ulation and state security forces. Their use of these new technologies, which has
become more apparent and sophisticated since their amalgamation with ISIS, has
enabled them not only to communicate with their followers, but also to spread their
propaganda messages both nationally and internationally. Furthermore, the videos
featuring Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau dressed in military fatigues hold-
ing a Kalashnikov rifle, standing amidst fleets of armored SUVs and sophisticated
weaponry, mimics similar militaristic visuals used by leaders of state security forces
(see Baker in this forum). This embodiment of militaristic practices used in order
to spread terror has shifted the underlying dynamics of militarization within Nige-
rian society that was reinforced with the kidnapping of the 276 Chibok school girls
in 2014 and subsequent video posted online showing the girls dressed in Islamic hi-
jabs, reciting the Qur’an. By directly streaming their conflict arena to domestic and
international audiences, Boko Haram has actively challenged traditional notions of
militarization within Nigerian society.
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So how has the rise of ICTs facilitated these competing notions of militariza-
tion? Here, it is important to note that militarization involves the process of
communication that legitimizes and normalizes the use of force within society as
“good, natural and necessary” (Jackson 2016). Since independence, the Nigerian
military has shaped societal politics through a distinctive regime of violence, which
has left an enduring legacy of militarization (Agbese 1990; Peters 1997; Kew 2010;
Ehwarieme 2011). Ensuing military regimes dramatically escalated the practices of
human rights abuses and gender-based violence to such an extent that they became
automatic and intrinsic behavioral mechanisms representing a hegemonic form of
masculinity (Mama 1998). Their behavior reveals “dominant, salient constructions
of gender in militaries. . .[that focus] in particular on ways in which certain ideas
about masculinity are fostered in military environments” (Basham 2016b, 29). As
such, these specific performances of power and authority have been used to pur-
sue, entrench, and normalize militarized values within Nigerian society.
Historically, the Nigerian military released statements through traditional state-
friendly media outlets declaring that Boko Haram was a small criminal gang and
not a viable security threat, a media strategy closely adhered to in the early days of
their counter-insurgency campaign. This, however, provoked widespread ridicule
as Boko Haram was able to emphatically contradict the military by posting videos
directly onto social media platforms. For instance, in August 2013 the Nigerian mil-
itary stated they fatally wounded Abubakar Shekau in a gun battle. Yet, less than
two months later, Shekau appeared in a video posted on Facebook mocking the
Nigerian military, contradicting their claims about his death. He declared the po-
litical class was part of a corrupt system deceiving the civilian population to stay in
power and encouraged people to mobilize against the government and join Boko
Haram. Another prominent case was the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls in
April 2014. The military declared their rescue days following their abduction. How-
ever, these claims were soon discredited. In response to such events, the Nigerian
military began to engage with the civilian population through social media as well
as through traditional forms of media to assert their successful counter-insurgency
campaign while also reclaiming their hegemonic status within society. They regu-
larly post photos and videos of “successful” raids in previously Boko Haram held
areas, riding in military tanks, and giving aid to internally displaced persons and
rebuilding infrastructure. When over one hundred of the Chibok schoolgirls were
released in 2016, the news broke on social media platforms, demonstrating a change
in their strategy against Boko Haram.
The Boko Haram insurgency has challenged the dominant norms of militariza-
tion embodied by the Nigerian military on two fronts. Boko Haram’s violent per-
formance of power has been clearly highlighted through the use of social media
platforms, demonstrating the castration of the hegemonic power of the Nigerian
military, making them appear fragile and vulnerable. The Nigerian military was ini-
tially caught unaware in April 2014 by how swiftly the Twitter campaign of #Bring-
BackOurGirls generated national and international headlines, leaving them defen-
sive and scrabbling to demonstrate their continued authority in the face of public
embarrassment at their incompetence. As a result, the military continue to actively
use social media platforms to demonstrate reported gains against Boko Haram in
an effort to continue the process of militarization onto a new generation too young
to remember the days of previous military dictatorships. Using a platform that many
people in the country constantly engage with normalizes the military’s continued
engagement in the internal security operations of the state.
Fundamentally, the rise of ICTs has empowered Boko Haram to embody the
imagery, language, and symbolism that have normalized the Nigerian military’s
predominance of everyday violence within society. In a country rife with corrup-
tion, human rights abuses, and stolen elections, political associations and civil
rights groups have taken to ICT platforms to increase political participation and
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association by facilitating and empowering those often ignored or silenced by the
state (Chiluwa 2012). Eighty percent of Nigerians own a mobile phone and 34 per-
cent access social networking sites (Silver and Johnson 2018). In early 2020, 42 per-
cent of Nigerians have access to the internet—an increase of 2 million people in
just one year (Kemp 2020), and the latest data available from Facebook state that
7.1 million users access Facebook on a daily basis via a mobile phone in Nigeria,
with the largest group of users between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years in
the major cities (Shapshak 2015). Bypassing the traditional media gatekeepers has
strengthened the influence of civil society by bolstering the credibility of their com-
munications and multiplying their audience reach in under-represented and inac-
cessible areas. This has loosened the authoritative grip of the military elites within
society and inspired and facilitated citizen engagement in a legitimate democratic
authority (Kew 2016).
Yet, digital technology has enabled one form of militarism to be replaced with
another. Since its transformation in 2009 into a violent jihadi group, Boko Haram
have skillfully exploited social media as a propaganda tool to indoctrinate citizens
through pervasive imagery and language familiar to them in a society where milita-
rization processes are already the norm. However, their tactics shifted from attack-
ing state and military targets to seizing villages and towns, targeting civilians, and
imposing a violently harsh version of Islamic law to set up and declare an Islamic
caliphate (Sampson 2016). This change in tactics used social media and not only
capitalized on the existing “militarization of terror” in society, but also transformed
and widened their sphere of influence by directly targeting individuals through
their mobile phones.
Mahmood (2017) has identified three key stages in how Boko Haram communi-
cate their messages, which demonstrates the shift in their use of social media. Dur-
ing the first phase (March 2010–September 2012), Boko Haram disseminated flyers
written in the local Hausa language after attacking communities and military and
state targets, briefed local media outlets, and sent videos to journalists at Agence
France-Presse. However, most videos were played for only a few minutes, leading
Shekau to record short videos to publicly voice the group’s grievances against the
federal government. In this time period, Boko Haram made seventy-nine recorded
messages and videos, which they disseminated via YouTube and showcased Shekau
as the public face of the insurgency.
During the second phase (September 2012–March 2015), Shekau dominated
much of the media messages of the insurgency group. He recorded longer video
messages, some lasting up to an hour, filmed in Kanuri or Hausa. Boko Haram
posted forty-nine video messages on YouTube and Facebook, and between January
and March 2015 created several Twitter accounts showing ongoing battles, photos
from the frontline, and tweets in Arabic and English (Mahmood 2017). Shekau
dressed in military fatigues and stood in front of or on top of a military tank, some-
times firing a machine gun. It was during this phase that Boko Haram kidnapped
276 schoolgirls in Chibok area in Borno state in April 2014. They paraded them on
video that was played around the world and inspired a national social media cam-
paign #BringBackOurGirls. The campaign went viral and led to the likes of former
US First Lady Michelle Obama and Hollywood celebrities highlighting the girls’
plight.
Phase 3 (March 2015–August 2016) coincided with Boko Haram’s pledge of al-
legiance to Islamic State (IS) on March 7, 2015. Following Shekau’s pledge to IS,
the quality of their videos drastically improved. All the videos were high-definition
with advanced graphics showing live action attacks and prison breaks, stoning and
beheading victims, and displays of the spoils of war.
What does this shift tell us about the relationship between social media and mil-
itarization? One might argue that the shift in different phases in messaging con-
tent from Phases 1 to 3 could be seen as the “militarization of terror,” as they
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highlight an internal shift in tactics and strategy by Boko Haram: from initially
taunting the Nigerian state and military to actively undermining their claims, to
then imitating militaristic visuals in order to gain credibility and gravitas from a
wider societal audience. Their use of social media has allowed the transformation
of a new type of militarization of terror, a calculated tactic to undermine the hege-
mony of the Nigerian military, as well as to highlight to a wider audience that they
are now the real power brokers within Nigerian society, a form of “targeted mili-
tarism” (Jackson et al. 2017). They have co-opted political spaces traditionally used
by the Nigerian military and distorted the dynamics of violence threshold in order
to further normalize acts of extreme violence. As such, they have transformed from
normalizing military violence to normalizing terror. Furthermore, in order for Boko
Haram to fulfill this self-assigned role, they have embodied and mimicked similar
militaristic visuals that the Nigerian military have utilized in order to distort the tra-
ditional understanding of militarization. At the same time, Boko Haram has added
to the meaning of how a society can be further terrorized with violence via ICTs. Not
only have these new forms of ICTs enabled this change to occur, they have actively
facilitated this shift. Non-state actors have hijacked the normalization of violence
and terror, thus further demonstrating that militarization is beyond the preserve of
state armed forces and institutions.
It is this juxtaposition that poses further questions regarding the tension be-
tween non-state groups and state armed forces in the militarization of terror. Re-
cent scholarship that examines the growing role of ICTs by violent extremists and
insurgency and terrorist groups highlights a new form of engagement (Klausen
2015; M. Conway 2017; Semati and Szpunar 2018). Is this shift of insurgent uses
of social media platforms a new form of “militarization of terror”? Has this type of
violence become “normal”? What does this tell us about the relationship between
terror and militarization? These questions underscore tensions within IR scholar-
ship and demonstrate that this relationship is not just a “Nigerian problem” or a
“blight within Africa,” but a serious question that needs further analysis to under-
stand how different agents of violence can impact and transform the process of mili-
tarization within society. That terrorist and insurgency groups are mirroring similar
militaristic practices of state armed forces demonstrates that we need to consider a
broader meaning of militarization, one that has transformed to include new actors
beyond the preserve of the state. In practice, the Boko Haram insurgency has cre-
ated an environment of terror where the Nigerian military has become victimized
and is threatened with similar amounts of violence as the civilian population. This
pressure has weakened the traditional dynamics of militarization within Nigerian
society in ways that elevate the insurgency group as the more authoritative violent
entity.
Arms Producers, Military Video Game
Industry, and PMSCs as Militarized Digital
Political Actors
SUSAN T. JACKSON
Stockholm University
JUTTA JOACHIM
Radboud University
NICK ROBINSON
University of Leeds
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Arms producers, the military video game industry, and PMSCs share market-
ing/branding approaches that make them powerful actors in IR in part because
of their ties to the everyday and their ubiquitous presence on social media. In 2017,
eighty-eight of the world’s top hundred conventional arms producers had at least
one official corporate YouTube channel; Call of Duty, a sales leader in the combat
video game industry, had combined sales of more than 250 million copies and gen-
erated US$15 billion in revenue; and of the 584 PMSCs surveyed in 2014, 252 had
at least one social media account (Jackson et al. 2017, 6). These figures are not
insignificant. These corporations all use their corporate promotional materials to
“sell” national security as military security in ways that normalize (state-sanctioned)
militarized political violence, whether by promoting the necessity of preparedness
via producing war materiel (Jackson 2012), by presenting war games for leisure
and pleasure (Robinson 2016), or by self-representing themselves as quasi-military
(Joachim and Schneiker 2018). They position themselves as one of the legitimate
voices in national security discourses, something integral to the construction and
maintenance of militarism and the processes of militarization. The intertextual way
in which these industries reference one another both supports and maintains the le-
gitimacy these companies seek. Especially important is that each of these seemingly
disparate industries frame militarism through an interrelated focus on national se-
curity as military security by assuming the necessity of the military, and, through
their online messaging, normalizing war and violence.
We explore the significance of how these corporations frame themselves on social
media using “authenticity,” “belonging,” and “real-ness,” which we argue are used
to generate a positive emotional connection with the military. These three tropes
are threaded throughout the online corporate promotional materials generated,
and originally circulated, by the arms and military video game industries and PM-
SCs. In addition to online portrayals of embodied militarism (Baker), insurgencies
(Oshikoya), and violence entrepreneurs (Grove), the message that the military is
a “natural” part of society and of people’s everyday lives is conveyed through the
celebration of military values, the wide distribution of this content, and the active
encouragement of user distribution and engagement with that content.
Popular culture is both a site for militarization and a place where “contentious
subjectivities” are formed; and, as with other forms of media, social media—as a
key space for popular culture—plays an important role in “memory, perception,
resonance and the creation of emotion” (Davies and Philpott 2012, 42, 46). Thus,
engaging with these industries’ social media campaigns challenges researchers to
see with precision as to how to categorize “visual phenomena and [be] explicit in
articulating how one should look at the media being investigated” (Robinson and
Schulzke 2016, 1000).
Corporations are a significant part of “banal,” “everyday” world politics, with cru-
cial implications for militarism andmilitarization. Through their advertising, corpo-
rations are important to how people construct meaning and identities. In the same
way as consumer industries create their messaging to reflect or construct values that
are related to their respective products, they indicate how we should act and what we
should value (Crane, Matten, and Moon 2013, our emphasis; see also Jackson 2019b;
Schneiker et al. 2018). What the arms and military video game industries and PM-
SCs are selling, though, is something fundamentally different insofar as it is tied to
modern state structures and specific types of policy responses that justify and legit-
imate certain kinds of political violence. As part of their branding, they construct
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the “good” citizen who supports the military including the material and ideational
fabric required to maintain it.
As with the other actors discussed here, social media has impacted outreach both
quantitatively (volume and speed) and qualitatively (visuality). Corporations can
bypass traditional information gatekeepers to communicate directly with people in
more personalized ways with the potential to “sell” war in people’s personal spaces.
Intended for a more widespread audience than in the past, their sophisticated
marketing techniques make it increasingly difficult to distinguish lines of author-
ity between state/military and non-state, in this case corporations, nation branding
(White and Kolesnicov 2015). As with other industries active on social media, the
outreach includes encouraging users to comment on and redistribute this corporate
social media content. This facilitation and encouragement are possible because of
how pervasive and established these actors are on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter,
in particular.1
According to Weber (2008), popular visual language is integral to being able to
claim contemporary literacy, a notion applicable to the arms and military video
game industries and PMSCs. Making use of visuality on social media, these industry
actors elicit emotions (which themselves are based on audience intertextual liter-
acy) in support of militarism (similar to Baker’s discussion on “meta-texts” in this
forum), by making national security seem exciting and relatable to everyday ex-
periences. For example, in their YouTube promotions, arms producers equate the
military with “everyday rugged life and superior performance” in ways that tie the
perception of the soldier as hero to perceptions about everyday life and what makes
good citizens (Jackson 2019b, 269). Similarly, branding themselves as “defender
of the nation’s safety with patriotic dedication” (Joachim et al. 2018, 306), PMSCs
appeal to prospective employees and emphasize the benefits they can gain when
working for PMSCs.
Conveying a sense of authenticity with respect to the experiences of the seller,
the depiction of the product or services and the viewer is an important element
for harnessing legitimacy. Marketers accomplish authenticity through the sincer-
ity of the stories they tell (Beverland 2005). In the case of arms producers, mil-
itary video game producers/developers, and PMSCs, both individually and as a
group, they strive to elicit a sense that they are among the real makers of the offi-
cial/authoritative national security narrative. To underscore the authenticity of this
claim, they rely on imagery of former soldiers and real(istic) weaponry. Further-
more, taking advantage of their close connections to the military, arms producers
use first-hand testimonials of former military personnel to demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of the weapons systems they are marketing (Jackson 2016), while the pro-
ducers of the Battlefield and Call of Duty series and the gameMedal of Honor Warfighter
rely, respectively, on military advisers and formal partnerships with weapons compa-
nies (Robinson 2016, 261–63). Leading US-based PMSCs try to appear as authentic
military actors by emphasizing that they serve their nation and national security or
when priding themselves that they are accredited top military-friendly employers
(Joachim et al. 2018). Regardless of the differences between them, these compa-
nies have in common that they try to instill a further sense of realness to their on-
line messages through the glorification of technology of weapons systems and the
clean war they are assumed to produce, a type of “techno-fetishism” (Stahl 2010).
This finds expression in the ads of the arms industry through sound effects and
images, e.g., the roar of a combat aircraft as it flies by, the displaying of an enemy
aircraft on a radar screen, or on-screen technology-related acronyms that the ca-
sual viewer might overlook (Jackson 2019b). Military video games, by comparison,
1
Our research has analyzed over 200 arms-related videos, produced by both industry and “fans,” that have been
watched over 570 million times alongside more than 500 videos produced by the video game industry and hosted on
their official YouTube channels that have been watched over 660 million times
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allow players quite frequently to simulate the use of modern hi-tech weaponry such
as drones, remote and aerial weapon systems, tanks, or attack helicopters, and in
so doing not only convey the allied forces’ overwhelming technological superiority,
but also frame combat in theatrical and spectacular terms (see McInnes 1999).
In addition to authenticity and realness, “belonging” is a key trope of marketers.
It quite often rests on the us/them dichotomy with a depiction of Western mili-
tary alliances against a “rogue brown” (and thus “foreign”) enemy (Jackson 2019b;
Joachim and Schneiker 2015, 2016)—a feeling of belonging that helps to legitimize
Western military interventions and reinforce the importance of family and com-
munity ties. Furthermore, the trope is based on the assumed split between, and
subsequent privileging of, the protector (often a hetero white male) and the pro-
tected. Arms producers, for example, promise pre-emptive intervention technology
to protect the vulnerable (Jackson 2019b), while PMSCs offer “humanitarian pro-
tection” (Joachim and Schneiker 2018) and video games are frequently based on a
plot involving the protection of US state/citizens against irrational actors who are
beyond reason (Robinson 2015, 459–62).
Next to these observations with respect to the marketing practices, we conclude
that exploring the social media presence of arms producers, the video game in-
dustry, and PMSCs offers knowledge about the social construction of hegemonic
military masculinities. Corporations belonging to these industries appear to rein-
force, albeit in varying degrees, traditional conceptions of the combat soldier and
the “hero-warrior” as authoritative constructions and based on the “ground truth”
these (former) soldiers embody (Wilkes 2015; Tidy 2016). Yet, the corporations
belonging to these industries add gentling aspects to these masculinities that para-
doxically work to reinforce them. For example, although families and communities
as a whole are depicted as upholding military values, it is the combat aircraft pilot
who simultaneously is responsible for/to the state while carrying the vulnerability
of being a family man. In the context of military video games, narratives often are
similarly framed. However, in these cases, families and communities are normally
only inferred rather than explicitly represented, while the player is engaged in mil-
itary combat for “the West” to protect/secure vulnerabilities at home. The same
can be said about PMSCs, which turn the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of veterans
into strength when they incorporate them into their corporate structure and claim
to transform wounded former soldiers into valued civilians who are essential for
national security.
IR scholars would do well in exploring these industries and their use of modern
forms of communication further—not least because they are becoming increasingly
prevalent in the everyday via their social media presence, and thus matter as politi-
cal actors in many, rarely explored ways. From bypassing traditional gatekeepers to
utilizing the fast, broader reach of modern ICTs while playing off the increased use
of visuality, the online presence of these industry actors calls for a more prominent
place in IR scholarship.
Militarization, the Gig Economy, and the
Indiscernibility of the Violence Entrepreneur
NICOLE SUNDAY GROVE
University of Hawai’i at Manoa
This essay reflects on a new kind of internationalized combatant, one I have else-
where referred to as the violence entrepreneur.2 Here I am interested in what this par-
2
The term is adapted from Jairus Grove (2016) and further developed in an article I published on the subject ti-
tled “Weapons of Mass Participation: Social Media, Violence Entrepreneurs, and the Politics of Crowdfunding for War”
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isr/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa035/5866651 by guest on 06 August 2020
18 Militarization 2.0
ticular fighter reveals about emerging relations between ICTs and militarization,
while challenging how the discipline of IR has understood questions of sovereignty,
violence, and war. The concept was originally developed out of a desire to under-
stand North American and European civilians traveling overseas to engage in com-
bat operations against the Islamic State, their use of crowdfunding platforms to
finance self-crafted missions abroad, and what I found to be the limits of the litera-
ture on private security and partisan violence to explain this phenomenon (Grove
2019). Whereas literature on private security tends to situate private military con-
tractors and other battlefield laborers within an economy of violence linked to mon-
etary and other forms of exchange, the voluntary and (usually) uncompensated
character of these acts of killing made it difficult to locate these self-identified “ISIS
hunters” within such an understanding of market relations. The difference, for me,
seemed to turn on the use of violence as an end unto itself in the innovation, en-
joyment, and redemptive quality of violence, rather than its instrumental use in the
pursuit of, for instance, money or survival (Grove 2019). Further, these combatants’
use of peer-to-peer lending platforms was organizing and circulating information
and resources in ways that were altering the exercise of state power in determin-
ing sovereign decisions over life and death, where individuals and small groups of
supporters were shaping the contours of enmity in ways that were significant to
geopolitics.
How can we understand the casual processes of militarization as they relate to
new forms of social action that coalesce around this type of combatant, and cor-
responding collective desires for violence and intervention? Often when we speak
of militarization as a process, it is to suggest that an object or person undergoes
a transformation where something or someone either is or is not militarized, and
can also potentially be demilitarized. For example, one could pose such an inquiry
in terms of how violence entrepreneurs’ engagements on social media militarize
those platforms. This question also could be inverted to consider how new collectiv-
ities on social media militarize those combatants who might have otherwise not felt
empowered or capable of acting in more extreme capacities, for instance, where
expressions of support mutate into decisions to engage directly in armed conflict.
Depending on how one understands the causal drivers and the directionality of
militarization as a process—that is, who or what is doing the militarization and to
what or whom—shapes how we understand the sites and excitations of new forms
of global violence.
It is, however, at the interstices of these two questions that the problem of this
research, and of the violence entrepreneur, is considered. As a term of explanation,
militarization is not often taken up to identify tenser inflection points where phase
shifts are happening in the making of something new. Is the violence entrepreneur
a soldier, an anarchist, a hero, a mercenary, an adventurer, or a murderer? Further,
should we think of crowdfunding platforms as community building resources for
funding creative works and helping individuals in need, or as a resource for fund-
ing and organizing non-state combatants in international conflict zones? There
is no clear answer here insofar as one could definitively say that the violence en-
trepreneur inhabits one or all of these identities, or that crowdfunding platforms
are or are not militarized. They can just as easily be used to pay someone to “kill
terrorists” in northern Iraq as they can to help a friend pay for new furniture or a
medical procedure. Thus, the violence entrepreneur engages us in thinking of mil-
itarization as a problématique, or a creative encounter with the world rather than an a
priori checklist of identifiers or a set of conditions against which we can measure if
and to what extent something is or is not militarized. In other words, it suggests that
the value of militarization as a question may not always produce codable categories,
(2017). I later came across another use of the term in Vadim Volkov (2002), whose definition of violence entrepreneur-
ship differs from mine in that Volkov is referencing the conversion of organized force into money or other material
assets (27).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isr/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa035/5866651 by guest on 06 August 2020
SUSAN T. JACKSON ET AL. 19
as this would treat militarization as something with boundaries already confirmed.
Instead, the violence entrepreneur begs the question of precisely what counts as
militarization, and also whether or not the category itself fully captures new forms
of collective and atomistic violence.
Violence entrepreneurs also demonstrate that militaries do not have a monopoly
on militarization any more than they have a monopoly on violence. New modes
of data capture, information sharing, and digital finance prompt us to reflect on
who or what the prime actors and processes of militarization may be. This does not
mean that militaries cannot benefit from the actions of violence entrepreneurs, but
it does mean that militaries are not planning, organizing, or defining their agen-
das. In actuality, militaries are often undecided about and vacillate over the value of
these atomistic combatants, who may sometimes be seen as disruptive or a liability.
Consider, for example, a recentMarine Corps Times report about two American civil-
ians who traveled to Syria voluntarily to fight with the Syriac Military Council and
were turned away as an “inconvenience” by US Special Forces after seeking help
to return to the United States (Snow 2017). At other times, these combatants pro-
vide necessary supplements to narratives of “freedom,” or even actual outcomes, for
instance, when Rolling Stonemagazine credited a “ragtag crew of leftist revolutionar-
ies” and “soldiers of fortune” with defeating ISIS (Harp 2018). These examples are
not about simple reversals, for example, of government positions on the presence
of these fighters on the battlefield. Neither do they represent simple inversions of
victory narratives that shift their focus from the veteran hero to Antifa. Rather they
suggest outright ambivalences in terms of the position of formal institutions in re-
lation to the individualization of combat.
These ambivalences not only constitute states’ relationships to singular
sovereigns, but also can be found in the antagonistic positions said fighters have to
their own governments, who in many cases justify their interventions as responses to
state failure, while also being intensely jingoistic. Consider here how contemporary
American vigilantes known as Minutemen suggest a blurring of military and citi-
zen authority at the location of border walls (Brown 2010). Violence entrepreneurs
often inhabit an anti-statist and anti-government ethos at the same time that they
claim to be fighting wars in the name of the United States (or Canada, or Europe,
or Australia, or the Netherlands), thus acting in the “spirit” of the sovereign while
not directly in its service. Here, militarization is also a problem of inquiry and a
challenge of research insofar as we cannot say that it always has rational state ends.
Historicizing these ambivalent relations is important for tracking connections and
shifts between violence entrepreneurs as a mutation of the so-called war on terror,
and their earlier antecedents. Related modes of violence legitimated after the fact
have been an integral component of American settler colonialism, for example, as
seen in organized settler massacres in the mid-nineteenth century in what was then
considered “Indian Country,” which paved the way for the western expansion of the
US rail system and the actualization of America’s homestead policy (Weigley 1973,
156; cited in Grove 2019).
To think about how so-called democratizing technologies authorize exceptional
forms of violence, and to engage analytically and politically with how the public-
ness of these virtually enhanced communities contributes to the creation of new
political zones that escape state capture is not to say that information generated
via these platforms cannot also be appropriated by government or military appara-
tuses. It is to say, however, that contemporary forms of communication and mobile
finance are functioning as the drivers and symptoms of mutating fields of secu-
rity, militarization, and war. Thus, it is necessary to identify how social media and
crowdfunding platforms play a significant role in transformations in the way vio-
lence is organized, as new interests, forms of enmity, and new actors engage these
platforms to facilitate that violence. As is often articulated within media theory,
we are always already in media res in relation to these processes, and thus should
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attempt to theorize them from the inside rather than beginning or ending with
categories that presume to know or describe what we find in systems previous to
investigation.
Peer-to-peer lending platforms are altering the conditions of the battlefield and
the exercise of state power in determining who the “enemies” are, as are new “non-
profit” security firms that have recently emerged as part of a drive to organize vio-
lence entrepreneurs in the form of the firm. These crowdfunding initiatives parallel
the adoption of civic crowdfunding models to provide public goods and other pub-
lic service provisions, where “security” is framed as a public good, for example, when
individuals can “fight terrorists abroad” so they do not have to be fought “at home”
(see also Manor and Crilley in this forum). These social platforms provide the in-
frastructure for planning, funding, and implementing individual missions, and raise
comparable questions to those centering on the commodification and multiplic-
ity of providers of security, which have displaced this provision from the jurisdic-
tion of states. Still, there is something about the organization of security around
what Ashton, Weber, and Zook (2017) call “market-like bidding mechanisms” that,
I think, mark a phase shift in new economies of violence, one that looks more like
the so-called gig economy than it does the outsourcing of security by states through
private contracts with for-profit corporations.
Both individual fighters and these new “non-profit” security providers employ
entrepreneurial logics and collaborative logics of platform participation to reorga-
nize how security is desired, experienced, and organized within interstitial spaces
of what is considered permissible and impermissible violence (Grove 2019). By po-
sitioning themselves and their supporters relative to imaginaries of state and eco-
nomic failure in the provision of security, crowdfunding platforms allow combatants
and donors to imagine and create new kinds of national communities around the
provision of atomistic forms of violence within what Çalıs ̧kan and Callon (2010)
call market encounters in digital space. These encounters demonstrate an empir-
ical mutation in the sovereign decision over enmity. Otherwise, it would not be
possible to make the claims that “having an adventure (i.e., killing ‘terrorists’)”
is one’s “own business” (Bofetta and Philipps 2015). Such combatants would be
considered mere criminals, rather than celebrated on daytime talk shows, or given
military-style funerals on Canada’s “Highway of Heroes” (Miller 2015). Of course,
violence entrepreneurs often rely on certain tropes and narratives distributed and
valorized by states and popular forces of militarization. However, each claim to na-
tionalism or national freedom is also a reinvention of that claim through the pro-
cess of claim-making itself. Crowdfunding platforms thus also play an effective role
in the creation of value between users, in the curation of communication and con-
nectivity, and in the formation of new publics within which these types of claims
are (re)articulated. The relationship between the fighter, the supporter, and the
platform becomes recursive—it is a self-amplifying system.
If militarization, as a theory or an approach, is to have explanatory power rather
thanmerely marking polemical or political differences in the justificatory logic of vi-
olence, then we need to do more to trace these processes in their formative stages,
where something crosses a threshold between militarization and something else.
What does it mean to say that violence entrepreneurs are simply murderers? Or
heroes? Or young men and women having an adventure? What is just on the other
side of each of these categories? It is important to mark conceptually what tips ever
so slightly into something on the other side of the soldier or adventurer into more
complicated terrain. We may never find the real lines between these things, as con-
cepts will only merely ever approximate them in the world, but it is worth trying
to identify the thresholds where something is or is not quite militarized. For me,
violence entrepreneurs inhabit this threshold of indiscernibility between private
murder, economic gain, adventurism, and new forms of security and militarization.
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Unlike legally or politically more determinant actors, violence entrepreneurs thrive
on this indiscernibility.
Reflections on Militarization 2.0
CYNTHIA ENLOE
Clark University
Here on a small shelf just above my left shoulder stands a tiny Australian toy sol-
dier attired in his distinctive hat with its upturned wide brim. Next to him stands an
Indian Sikh soldier in his handsome red tunic and turban. These are classic lead sol-
diers. They both hold rifles, but their arms or legs never move, and their weapons re-
main silent. They seem an eon distant from the action-packed, in-perpetual-motion,
explosive world of today’s digital warriors.
As these innovative research-based essays reveal, the digital militarization we are
experiencing today is a process marked by distinctive features: its speed, its seductive
pull on individuals in private spaces, its defiance of political boundaries, and its vast
array of state and non-state actors (many of whom cannot be easily traced). Those
distinctive features of militarization are barely being taken into explicit account by
most analysts of international politics. They (well, us too, most of the time) may
not be back in the era of toy lead soldiers, but they/we have yet to recraft our
curiosities and our methodologies so that they can accurately capture the causes
and consequences of digital militarization.
Despite these distinctive and under-researched features of digital militarization,
however, there are significant continuities between pre-digital and digital pro-
cesses of militarization that are underscored here in these fascinating essays of
“Militarization 2.0.”
First, paying serious attention to both the toy soldiers and the digital war-
riors reminds us that militarizing processes have always insinuated themselves
into the daily lives of civilians. Militarization never has been confined simply
to transforming civilians into uniformed soldiers. Militarizing processes have
long relied on strategies that normalized war waging for women and men, girls
and boys living lives apparently distant from either state or insurgent military
forces.
Second, paying serious analytical attention to the games created to propel both
the stiff little toy soldiers and the superhuman digital warriors into fictive action un-
derscores the importance of imagination and narratives in fueling militarization’s
insinuating process. We will never fully comprehend the allure of militarization
across cultures if we stay focused just on strategic actors and strategic doctrines.
The designers and propagators of digital militarizing processes may have speed and
spatial reach on their side, yet they stand on the shoulders of creative storytellers
from the Greeks to MGM.
Third, taking seriously the international politics of both digital and pre-digital
militarizing processes can nudge us to ask broadly about who in any setting at any
time are the militarizers: not just public civilian state officials, not just uniformed
military officers, not just weapons corporate CEOs and engineers, but also per-
haps toymakers, animators, scriptwriters, advertisers, marketers, entertainment cor-
porations’ software engineers, insurgent movements’ recruiters, fashion designers,
teachers, mothers, and fathers.
Fourth, as I cast one eye toward the carefully painted toy soldiers and with the
other watch the animated digital characters, I am reminded that every militarizing
process, dramatic or subtle, needs to be interrogated with a feminist curiosity. A
conscious feminist investigatory approach to any militarizing process prompts us to
question how and when the processes by which militarization insinuates itself into
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anyone’s life are shaped significantly by the workings of masculinities and feminini-
ties. Digital militarization has not made masculinities passé. Digital militarization is
not immune to wielding femininities. Sped-up storylines are fraught with gendered
narratives. Boundary-defying messaging does not make gender inquiries obsolete.
The hip software engineers are not genderless; nor are the people who employ
them, nor are the viewers who find their products tantalizing.
Recognizing these four continuities between pre-digital and digital militariza-
tions, of course, does not mean that nothing in the ways militarizing processes op-
erate has changed over the generations. Reading these articles definitely banished
any tendency to slide into ho-hum smugness.
These researchers have opened my eyes to what is new, what I need to be more
aware of. Each of these authors reveals how the current digital militarizing processes
are distinguished from past militarizing processes especially by their high speed,
their vast volume, their multiple authors, their geographic reach, and their graphic
visibility. Each attribute is making it harder for us to track the routes of today’s
militarization. They make it harder to monitor how exactly militarizing images and
narratives insinuate their nightmares and their reassurances into diversely gendered
people’s emotional and intellectual lives.
What is harder to track and harder to monitor is tougher to challenge.
The engaging articles featured here—describing digitally militarizing processes
in Sweden, the United States, Nigeria, Israel, and Croatia—have made me sit up and
take notice of the growing cast of militarizers. They may be competitors, yet they
share a stake in persuading not just civilian legislators and potential government
procurers, but also civilians that the world is a dangerous place.
Likewise, as we learn here, it is not only officials in ministries of defense, but
also officials in MFAs who can amplify a state’s warning chorus depicting enemies
on the borders and global threats looming. Similarly, today, sophisticated digital
militarizers include both a state’s counter-terrorist security forces and the insurgent
forces they are mandated to combat.
Joining in this already-crowded field of militarizers is every civilian internet user—
at breakfast, on the subway, and sitting up in bed—who spreads their messages of
danger, fear, power, excitement, or pride by clicking on “like” or “share.”
Arms-producing corporations, private security companies, digital gaming pro-
ducers, MFAs, leaders, states’ counter-terrorist forces, insurgent militias, and
entrepreneurs—each of them is gendered. So too are those girls and boys, women
and men who consume and respond to these militarizers’ seductive high-speed mes-
sages. I have some clues as to how ideas about omnipresent dangers and about force
as a solution rely on gendered values and presumptions in some of these settings.
Still, I am acutely limited by huge gaps in my knowledge and understanding of pre-
cisely how any particular wielding of diverse masculinities and femininities operates
in each of these digital militarizing sites. Those gaps certainly curtail my capacity
to track and monitor, not to mention contribute to any challenges to those digital
militarizing processes.
Together, we have so much more to learn about today’s digitalized militarizing
dynamics. The keen observers who created this forum have set us off on a collective
analytical journey. It is, I think, a journey fueled by urgency.
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